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1. Introduction
Sixty years ago, South Korea (henceforth Korea) was one of the poorest countries 
in the world. Today, Korea is reasonably well-to-do, with a living standard comparable 
to that of lower-end advanced industrial countries. If ever there was a country 
deserving of the term economic ‘miracle,’ it is indeed Korea. 
What happened, of course, was rapid economic growth. After having been 
devastated by war from 1950 to 1953, the Korean economy then stagnated  for about 
a decade. However, Korea’s economic growth took off in the mid-1960s. Korea’s per 
capita GDP grew by about 7.0% from 1963 to 1979, and about 6.5% from 1980 
up to 1996. Korea was then hit by a crisis in 1997 and growth slowed somewhat, 
but the growth rate still remains high relative to global standards. The growth of 
Korea’s per capita GDP has actually been the fastest in the world over the last sixty 
years, as shown in Table 1. Considering that the growth rate worldwide is much higher 
in the last sixty years than in earlier periods, as can be inferred from Table 1, Korea’s 
growth spurt is the single largest to date in world economic history.1)  
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 1) Table 1 shows that, from 1950 to 2008, Taiwan comes as a close second to Korea. Since Korea 
grew faster than Taiwan in 2009 and is expected to do so in 2010, the gap will increase if we 
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<Table 1> Growth Rate of GDP per capita
Unit: percent
1820-1913 1913-1950 1950-2008
World 0.89 0.88 2.24 
Western Europe 1.15 0.76 2.72 
Western Offshoots1) 1.59 1.56 2.05 
Asia 0.19 0.08 3.62 
Latin America 0.83 1.41 1.78 
Africa 0.45 0.90 1.20 
Former USSR 0.83 1.76 1.78 
　 　
Austria 1.13 0.18 3.28 
Belgium 1.26 0.70 2.56 
Denmark 1.21 1.56 2.21 
Finland 1.07 1.91 3.05 
France 1.21 1.08 2.54 
Germany 1.32 0.17 2.94 
Italy 0.90 0.85 3.04 
Netherland 0.85 1.07 2.47 
Norway 1.21 2.18 2.90 
Sweden 1.43 2.16 2.24 
Switzerland 1.48 2.06 1.77 
UK 1.15 0.93 2.14 
Spain 0.77 0.17 3.86 
Austraila 2.50 0.99 2.14 
Canada 1.73 1.35 2.17 
USA 1.56 1.61 2.06 
Argentina n.a. 0.74 1.37 
Brazil 0.24 1.97 2.35 
Mexico 0.89 0.85 2.12 
China -0.09 -0.56 4.78 
India 0.25 -0.22 2.74 
Indonesia 0.38 -0.23 2.99 
Japan 0.79 0.88 4.36 
Korea 0.40 -0.05 5.55 
Malaysia 0.43 1.50 3.31 
Singapore 2.98 1.50 4.47 
Taiwan 0.31 0.61 5.54 
Thailand 0.42 -0.08 4.17 
Egypt 0.69 0.02 2.46 
Notes: 1) Western offshoots are Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US.
       2) GDP is at purchsing power parity in 1990 constant prices. 
Source: Maddison (2010).
Korea’s high growth performance is actually a part of the better performance of 
the capitalist global economy in the twentieth (and twenty-first) century. In the first 
take 1950-2010 figures.
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half of the twentieth century, capitalism was in crisis, with the Great Depression, two 
world wars, and two great revolutions, as can be inferred from Table 1. In the latter 
half of the twentieth century (and the first decade of the twenty-first century), 
capitalism has fared better than in the previous era. Thus, there were precedents to 
the Korean economic ‘miracle.’ In the 1950s there was German economic ‘miracle’—
Miracle of the Rhine. The German miracle was followed by the Japanese economic 
‘miracle’ in the 1960s, which first made double digit growth rate a familiar 
phenomenon. Germany and Japan are the more conspicuous examples. Continental 
European countries such as Italy and France have also shown ‘miraculous’ growth 
performance. 
The nature of those miracles is the ‘catch-up’ growth of latecomer countries. In 
the last sixty years, not only the frontier – i.e. the US – economy has fared better 
than in the previous era but latecomers have also shown spectacular performance in 
their catch-up growth.  Given their gap with the frontier country and their domestic 
capability, strong growth is natural. Of course, this was supported by the 
reconstruction of the world capitalist system after its collapse in the first half of the 
twentieth century. 
However, the preceding cases of Japan, Germany, and Italy are all the “first world” 
countries, comprising the members of the imperialist powers before the Second World 
War. Korea’s high- growth performance is remarkable for being the first among the 
“third world” countries. Of course, Korea’s high growth performance has been 
followed by more such cases in the third world countries, notably those of China, 
India, and Vietnam. Korea’s growth performance is an intermediate one lying between 
the Japanese and European ‘miracles’ on the one hand and the Chinese, Indian, and 
Vietnamese ‘miracles’ on the other. Korea’s spurt is stronger and longer than the 
Japanese or European one because Korea started from a lower base. Likewise, China’s 
or India’s spurt may be stronger and last longer than Korea’s because they have started 
from an even lower base than Korea. However, that may happen in the future, and 
as far as the last sixty years are concerned, Korea holds the record for the highest 
growth. Korea actually has become the only country that has transformed itself form 
a “third world” country to a “first world” country within the last sixty years. 
This paper will investigate how that has been achieved. Of course, much ink has 
already been spilled on this subject. This paper will do the job by incorporating some 
new historical perspective and utilizing updated evidence. The rest of the paper is 
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organized as follows: Section 2 will examine the causes of the strong growth 
performance that could be attributed to the period before the Korean economy began 
to grow rapidly in the 1960s; Section 3 will investigate the emergence of the 
developmental state together with outward-looking development strategy as a cause 
of this growth performance. Section 4 will examine Korean industrial policy; and 
Section 5 will discuss the liberalization process from the 1980s.
 
2. Background
Is some historical legacy from traditional society responsible for Korea’s exemplary 
economic growth? This is the view forwarded by some prominent political scientists 
or sociologists. The argument mainly takes the form of relating growth performance 
to ‘culture.’ (see Huntington 2000, for example). However, it is not easy to understand 
the relationship between culture and economic growth. Culture may account for 
economic growth, but how? In the case of Korea, there are clear cases of the 
contribution of the ‘culture’ as historical legacy, such as ethnic homogeneity that 
should have made it easier to form a national consensus. Legacies of the past, such 
as the Korean alphabet ‘Hangeul’, should also have helped to enhance the level of 
education easily and quickly. On the other hand, there are less persuasive cases such 
as the role of Confucianism. Experts emphasizing the influence of Confucianism in 
East Asia tended to point to Confucianism as a source of backwardness when East 
Asian economies stagnated in the past; when they do well later, those experts again 
say it is because of Confucianism. There are also some embarrassing cases like the 
ad hoc observations by Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama (1996) says that the level of trust 
among the people of the countries is a base upon which a country can build large 
modern corporations. South Korea stands out as a remarkable example where large 
corporations were built through government initiatives even though Korean society 
lacked the trust level needed to do so. If that is true, how can one explain Samsung 
and LG outshining Sony or Panasonic these days? How can Hyundai, though still 
behind Toyota or Honda, surpass GM or Ford? Culture, like all other aspects of 
human life, can change over the years, but it needs time, probably longer than a few 
years. Thus, cultural change cannot explain the changes in a short span of time, such 
as the sudden jump of Korea’s GDP growth rate in the mid-1960s.
Meanwhile, ever since Theodore Schultz’s famous observation (1964) that even the 
poorest peasants of the least developed countries can optimize, economists have 
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emphasized the universal nature of economic motivation. Human beings are the same 
in their ability for ‘rational choice.’ Thus, people respond to incentives, not only in 
North America and Europe but also in Asia, Africa and Latin America. What counts 
therefore is the structure of those incentives as determined by institutions and policies, 
which may, in turn, be affected most of all by political conditions.  
On the other hand, the legacy of more recent history may have more clearly helped 
the growth performance. The Japanese colonial rule (1910-45) was unique in creating 
industrial capacities in its colonies such as Korea, though it created grievances 
politically and socially. Although it is questionable whether that physical capital 
survived the devastation of the Korean War, many of the human resources, including 
the very experience of industrialization, should have survived. 
The post-liberation and Korean War period (1945-1953) saw the influx of 
enterprising and talented people from the North as the communist regime was 
consolidated there. This was less clearly visible in Korea than in Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Singapore, but it should have helped the subsequent economic growth. During 
this period, Korea also carried out land reforms, in contrast with other countries in 
continental Asia such as Nationalist China or South Vietnam. Land reform, of course, 
subsequently brought political stability to the rural areas. 
As noted earlier, the Korean economy stagnated for a decade after the Korean War. 
The growth rate of per capita GDP during the nine years from 1954 to 1962 was 
0.9%, which was indeed low considering that Korea was recovering from the 
devastation of the war. However, this was mainly due to the stagnation of agriculture. 
The manufacturing sector grew by a respectable 11.7% from 1954 to 1962, and Korea 
underwent typical import-substituting industrialization with “light” industries 
(henceforth referred to as LIs) such as cotton textiles, sugar, and flour. 
Import-substituting industrialization was financed by foreign aid. As a country at 
the forefront of the Cold War, Korea received more than 4.4 billion dollars of 
economic aid, mostly grants-in-aid from the US. The aid was concentrated in the 
period from 1953 to 1962, with 2.5 billion dollars received during those years. During 
that period, aid accounted for 14.6 percent of GNI and 146 percent of gross domestic 
fixed capital formation. Korea could thus build capacities in the LIs without the 
painful process of mobilizing domestic savings, especially from the rural area, in the 
early phase of industrialization. 
This period (together with the 1945-53 period) also saw an explosive increase in 
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all levels of education, as shown in Table 2. Thus, by the early 1960s, while Korea 
was a lesser developed country economically, its education level was comparable to 
that of advanced countries. This was probably made possible by the maintenance of 
consumption levels of the majority of the population, which was in turn made possible 
by the access to foreign aid and implementation of land reform. 
<Table 2> Number of School Enrollment
Unit: 1,000; % 
1945 1952 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Elementary school 1,336.0 2,369.9 3,662.7 5,749.3 5,658.0 4,868.5 4,020.0 (56.4) (100.0) (154.6) (242.6) (238.7) (205.4) (169.6)
Junior high school 50.31) 291.6 528.6 1,318.8 2472.0 2,275.8 1,860.5 (14.3) (100.0) (181.3) (452.3) (847.7) (780.5) (638.0)
High school 50.31) 59.4 164.5 315.6 932.6 1,473.2 1,324.5 (14.3) (100.0) (276.9) (531.3) (1570.0) (2480.1) (2229.8)
High school
(vocational)
33.2 74.5 99.1 275.0 764.2 810.7 74.7 
(44.6) (100.0) (133.0) (369.1) (1025.8) (1088.2) (100.3)
College, technical 
college and beyond
7.8 34.1 101.0 193.6 597.9 1,466.9 2,829.0 
(22.9) (100.0) (296.2) (567.7) (1,753.4) (4,301.8) (8,296.2)
Notes: 1) There was no distinction between junior high school and high school up to 1945.
        2) Figures in the parentheses are percentage to 1952.  
Sources: Ministry of Education and National Statistical Office.
3. Developmental State and Outward-looking Development
The growth rate of Korea’s per capita GDP suddenly jumped from -0.6% in 1962 
to 6.2% in 1963. Although this was mainly due to the recovery from the disastrous 
agricultural production in 1962, which accounted for about 40% of GDP at that time, 
strong growth was sustained thereafter. 
There are basically two reasons for the sustained growth. 
The first is the emergence of a ‘developmental state.’ After taking power through 
a military coup in 1961, President Park Junghee wanted to legitimize his power by 
economic growth. He wanted to build a state modeled after Japan’s prewar and 
postwar developmental state. That was what he had been familiar with during his 
youth, including his tenure as an officer in the Japanese imperial army. More 
importantly, Japan was setting the best example of catch-up growth in the postwar 
period. Under President Park’s quasi-authoritarian and subsequently authoritarian 
regime, Korea became a ‘hard state,’ capable of implementing a policy once it was 
decided. 
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The Korean developmental state went far beyond the role of the state commonly 
accepted in textbooks: providing secure property rights, political stability, 
macroeconomic stability, and controlling externality. It involved economic ‘planning,’ 
though it was no more than indicative planning to gather consensus among 
government agencies and between the government and the private sector. The fiscal 
system was mobilized to influence the behavior of the private sector, using tax 
deductions and exemptions, if not cash subsidies, as incentives. The degree of 
strictness in the surveillance of tax evasion was also an important means of setting 
incentives. The government nationalized banks and carried out credit rationing, setting 
the official interest rate at a level below a market-clearing rate. The government also 
employed ‘policy loans’ for particular purposes such as exports and industrial policy, 
which carried the interest rate further below a market-clearing rate. 
The second reason for the take-off was the switch to export-oriented 
industrialization or, more generally, outward-looking development strategy. President 
Park’s government initially tried to move to the second stage import-substituting 
industrialization, based on the ‘backward linkage’ effect of the first stage 
import-substituting industrialization. However, it soon switched to export-oriented 
industrialization. Exports as a percentage of GDP rose rapidly through the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Total exports (exports of goods and services) was no more than 4.8 
percent of  GDP in 1963, but it came to account for 31.0 percent of GDP by 1976. 
Korea exported products of LIs that had been established under the 
import-substituting industrialization in the previous period. As the share exports rose, 
so the share of imports rose to meet their demands, that is, the demands for raw 
materials, intermediate goods, and machinery.
The switch was probably the feature of economic policy that most distinguished 
Korea – and other members of the ‘Gang of the Four’ –from other developing 
countries in the 1960s. The prevailing strategy then was still import-substituting 
industrialization or inward-looking development strategy.
Why did Korea deviate from convention? The answer is simple: there was no 
alternative because of dwindling foreign aid. By the late 1950s, there had already been 
a consensus among Korean businessmen and government officials that the only 
alternative left was promoting exports. The major stumbling block was that the US, 
whose utmost priority then was to revive the Japanese economy, was prohibiting 
Korean goods from competing with Japanese goods on US soil. But in the 1960s 
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the US decided to encourage rather than discourage developing countries’ exports to 
its shores (Woo 1991: Chapters 3, 4).
Although Korea switched to export-oriented industrialization because of the lack 
of alternatives, this proved to be the right choice. The fundamental reason is that 
the import-substituting industrialization was anachronistic: it was based on the 
memories of the previous era. Those memories were composed of, first of all, the 
collapse of the world capitalist system in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
second memory was that of imperialism. Before the Second World War, for most 
developing countries, integration into the global capitalist economy meant becoming 
a colony  or politically subjugated. When they achieved independence after the Second 
World War, they wanted to pursue ‘economic independence’ as well as political 
independence by reducing the degree of integration. As a result, Latin America was 
sticking to the import-substituting industrialization that they had embarked on in the 
inter-war period. India emulated the Soviet Union to build an ‘independent’ national 
economy. China became completely severed from the capitalist world economy with 
the installation of a strong nationalist-communist regime.
However, the age of imperialism was over with the Second World War. It is not 
easy to define the nature of the postwar world capitalist system that replaced the 
previous system of imperialism. However, the new system under the US hegemony 
was characterized by setting a broader area of influence through free trade but not 
by acquiring territories (Cumings 1987). As a result, being economically integrated 
came to mean not being politically subjugated. Indeed, being close to the rich and 
powerful is beneficial to the poor and weak if the former does not use violence.
Given this situation, integration is a necessary condition for successful growth. It 
is difficult to imagine that a latecomer country can develop without being linked to 
the market, capital and technology provided by advanced countries. All economic 
miracles in the last sixty years have occurred through raising the degree of integration.
Actually, by switching to outward-looking development, Korea could enjoy the 
benefits that developing countries still clinging to inward-looking development strategy 
had to forgo. 
First, in the process of exporting goods, market discipline was introduced to Korean 
firms, providing an ultimate standard of performance. Export-oriented industriali-
zation, with the objective standard of performance decided by competitiveness in the 
world market, left less room for ‘X-inefficiency’ and ‘rent seeking’ – pervasive 
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phenomena in developing countries.2) It also enabled firms to realize economies of 
scale.
Second, increasing export earnings enabled Korea to continue borrowing from the 
international capital market to replace the role of decreasing foreign aid. Korea could 
avoid the ‘stop-go’ pattern of economic growth often observed in contemporary 
developing countries pursuing import-substituting industrialization, which suffered the 
recurring shortage of foreign exchange.
Third, outward-looking development was accompanied by a heavy learning and 
modernizing effect. A lot of ‘know-how’ and new attitudes of life were transferred 
by foreign (mostly, advanced countries’) buyers, sellers and investors. This was 
probably the most important effect of outward-looking development, which was 
quickly pointed out by Keesing (1967), but actually can be traced back to the 
elaboration by John Stuart Mill (1965: 581-2) in the nineteenth century.
Fourth, export-oriented industrialization created more jobs for larger number of 
workers. They were low wage jobs, but since these wages were higher than the level 
that was earned by the ‘underemployed’ workers in the countryside, they provided 
an escape route from poverty. This made a contrast with the situation under 
import-substituting industrialization, where a few privileged workers in the 
monopolistic (or oligopolistic) producers received higher wages but most other 
workers were unemployed. Export-oriented industrialization also made it possible to 
exploit the educational achievement that Korea had made up to the early 1960s: 
education could contribute to economic growth only when workers were provided 
with employment opportunity.
Moreover, Korea could benefit from the timing of the switch to export-oriented 
industrialization. In the 1960s, advanced industrial countries were enjoying an 
unprecedented boom, and Korea, together with other members of the “Gang of the 
Four,” were only a small minority among developing countries to switch to 
outward-looking development. They thus apparently enjoyed some ‘quasi-rent.’
More importantly, the early switch meant that Korea could control how it was 
integrated into the world capitalist economy. While exporting freely to advanced 
countries, Korea could protect its domestic market, give subsidies to industries, and 
 2) It may be useful to remember in this context that elaboration of the concept of X-inefficiency 
by Leibenstein (1966) and the concept of rent-seeking by Krueger (1974) rely heavily on the cases 
from developing countries. See also Krueger (1978) and Balassa and Associates (1982).
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regulate foreign investment (both direct and portfolio investment). This international 
environment allowed such asymmetric relationships until the early 1980s. Multilaterally, 
the asymmetrical relationship between developed and developing countries was 
allowed under the IMF-GATT system. Bilaterally, the US, and to a less extent other 
developed countries, were willing to tolerate the asymmetric relationship, given their 
overwhelming economic prowess and the preoccupation with Cold War politics. 
During this period, developed countries were also quite liberal in transferring 
technology.
From the mid-1980s, the US and other developed countries were no longer willing 
to allow an asymmetrical relationship, but at that point it was not critical. By then, 
Korea was embarking on liberalization on its own. In other words, the early switch 
enabled Korea to ‘sequence’ the government intervention and liberalization at its own 
discretion.
 
4. Industrial Policy
Korea pursued outward-looking development with the government playing a role 
beyond the commonly accepted ones under the asymmetrical international relationship. 
This means that Korea implemented industrial policy, a policy to target more dynamic 
sectors of the economy. 
Contrary to the international division of labor in the colonial era, outward-looking 
development in the postwar period was based on exporting labor intensive 
manufactured goods to developed countries. While absorbing this export is a sensitive 
political issue in developed countries, developing countries are not without their own 
problems. A typical defense of liberal policy towards imports of unskilled labor 
intensive goods from developing countries within developed countries is that their 
workers earn higher wages in export industries than in import competing ones 
(Bergsten 1997). This means that, as a corollary, developing countries pursuing an 
outward-looking development strategy cannot be satisfied with the static international 
division of labor, that is, specialization in unskilled labor intensive products. They have 
to avoid being ‘locked in’ with low skill intensive products.
Of course, as the economy grows, owing to the dynamics created by the 
outward-looking development, human resources are upgraded through experience, 
learning, and education. Firms also demand higher quality human resources, planning 
investment while taking the future trend of the economy as well as the present one 
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into consideration. Growing faster and pursuing more profit by investing in more 
dynamic sectors of the economy is the inherent objective of capitalist firms. 
Problems arise only when private enterprise cannot do that - that is, when markets 
fail. This is indeed the essence of the infant industry argument, the venerable 
theoretical ground for industrial policy. If future benefit of an infant industry 
outweighs current cost, there is no reason that private enterprises should not invest. 
Only some discrepancy between private and social cost and benefit justifies 
government intervention. The sources of market failure in developing countries often 
cited include, first of all, the very shortage of entrepreneurial ability to take risk and 
make long term investment, capital market imperfections, externality in creating 
information training labor, and lumpiness in investment (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; 
Melitz 2005; Sauré 2007; Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare 2009).
It is not easy to exactly address these sources of market failure. Apparently, for 
this reason, developing countries choosing outward-looking development differed in 
the degree of government intervention, ranging from the minimalist approach of Hong 
Kong to the very activist one of Korea. The Korean government was actually even 
more activist that the Japanese government in an earlier period, which did not pursue 
a proper industrial policy of targeting infant industries (Beason and Weinstein 1996). 
The ‘hard state’ nature of the Korean developmental state under the authoritarian rule 
of President Park apparently made this possible. 
Korean industrial policy took the form of a “heavy and chemical industry” drive 
in the 1970s, though it was a move with precedents in the late 1960s. Although the 
policy targeted “heavy and chemical industries” (henceforth HCIs) as infant industries, 
its eventual aim was to foster high technology industries rather than smokestack 
industries. HCIs targeted by industrial policy consisted of chemicals, metals, machinery 
(including electronic machinery), and transportation equipment. LIs not targeted were 
the rest of manufacturing industries: food, textile, garments, footwear, and wood 
products, among others.
The government heavily protected HCIs. Liberal tax exemptions and reductions, 
if not cash subsidies, were offered to HCIs for the same reasons. The most important 
source of subsidy, however, was financial. The government treated HCIs preferentially 
in the credit rationing carried out by nationalized banks. There were also many ‘policy’ 
loans earmarked for industrial policy that carried interest rates further below 
market-clearing rate.
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Table 3 gives effective rate of protection, effective corporate tax rate, and average 
cost of borrowing for HCIs and LIs from 1970. Effective rate of protection and 
effective corporate tax rate should reflect the incentives provided by trade and fiscal 
policies. The average cost of borrowing is no more than approximation of the exact 
amount of the margin of the subsidy provided through credit rationing. However, 
it should reflect, if not totally, the effect of government policy because the government 
had overwhelming influence through the credit rationing by nationalized banks and 
provision of policy loans. Their differences are also presented, since what matters as 
incentive in resource allocation is the difference rather than the absolute level itself.
Table 3 shows that Korea implemented industrial policy in the 1970s. HCIs targeted 
by industrial policy received higher ERP than LIs not targeted, as of 1970. 1978, the 
gap in the ERP widened to 43.1 percent points. The difference in effective corporate 
tax rate began to rise in 1973 to reach more than 30 percentage points by 1975 and 
stayed there until 1981. The difference in the average cost of borrowing rose from 
1971 and stayed at a relatively high level from 1976 to 1979.
The government also built industrial parks and distributed factory sites to the first 
entrants at a subsidized rate to internalize externality. In Korea, until the early 1980s, 
a businessman could be arrested on the charge of poaching workers from other 
businessmen, that is, for stealing the training cost.
As it offered the favorable conditions for HCIs, the government restricted entry 
and selected the businessmen to take care of them. Since the selected came from 
existing businessmen, the government encouraged the diversification of firms, or the 
establishment of chaebol, Korean business conglomerates, in a full-fledged form. This 
policy aimed at utilizing the limited talent of entrepreneurship more intensively and 
creating an internal capital (and labor) market for long term investment. The 
restriction of entry could also be justified in terms of compensating early starters for 
the externality they created, as well as the narrowness of the domestic market.3) 
Through these measures, the government aimed at fostering local firms as eventual 
‘global players’, with their own brand names and technological capabilities.
Industrial policy inflicted a large cost on the Korean economy, the first of which 
being the welfare cost to consumers and taxpayers. No less important were 
macroeconomic instability in the short run, and a dysfunctional financial system 
 3) For the description of policies that Korean government undertook in this respect, see Jones and 
Sakong (1980).
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<Table 3> Effective Rate of Protection, Effective Corporate Tax Rate and 
Average Cost of Borrowing
Unit: percent
Year
Effective rate 
of protection
Effective corporate 
tax rate
Average cost 
of borrowing
Promoted Non-promoted
Differ-
ence Promoted
Non-
promoted
Differ-
ence Promoted
Non-
promoted
Differ-
ence
1970 25.5 8.7 16.8 39.2 39.4 -0.2 17.7 15.5 2.2
1971 　 　 　 34.9 34.7 0.2 12.9 14.4 -1.5
1972 　 　 　 27.7 29.8 -2.1 10.5 13.3 -2.8
1973 　 　 　 33.5 38.6 -5.1 8.7 10.9 -2.3
1974 　 　 　 29.9 37.7 -7.8 10.4 10.6 -0.2
1975 6.8 -15.1 21.9 15.9 52.1 -36.2 10.2 12.2 -1.9
1976 　 　 　 18.0 51.0 -33.0 10.1 13.7 -3.6
1977 　 　 　 17.5 49.5 -32.0 11.5 14.3 -2.8
1978 37.4 -5.7 43.1 16.9 48.4 -31.5 10.1 15.9 -5.8
1979 　 　 　 18.3 48.5 -30.2 12.5 16.6 -4.1
1980 44.2 10.7 33.5 18.3 48.8 -30.5 17.6 20.1 -2.5
1981 　 　 　 20.6 51.1 -30.5 17.5 19.6 -2.2
1982 　 　 　 47.1 48.2 -1.1 15.3 16.9 -1.6
1983 26.2 8.7 17.5 40.4 42.2 -1.8 12.9 14.6 -1.7
1984 　 　 　 　 　 　 14.4 14.5 -0.1
1985 15.2 -2.5 17.7 　 　 　 12.7 14.8 -2.0
1986 　 　 　 　 　 　 12.0 13.5 -1.6
1987 　 　 　 　 　 　 12.1 13.4 -1.3
1988 9.9 -13.5 23.4 　 　 　 12.7 13.6 -0.9
1989 　 　 　 　 　 　 13.5 13.8 -0.2
1990 12.9 -5.8 18.7 　 　 　 12.5 13.1 -0.5
1991 　 　 　 　 　 　 12.7 13.5 -0.8
1992 　 　 　 　 　 　 11.9 13.2 -1.4
1993 6.6 -0.9 7.5 　 　 　 10.9 12.0 -1.2
1994 　 　 　 　 　 　 11.1 12.3 -1.2
1995 3.9 -1.3 5.2 　 　 　 11.3 12.8 -1.5
1996 　 　 　 　 　 　 10.9 12.2 -1.3
Data: 1) Effective rate of protection calculated from Kim and Hong (1982) and Hong (1997).
       2) Effective corporate tax rate from Kwack (1985).
       3) Average cost of borrowing from the Bank of Korea, Financial Statements Analysis.
emanating from the government influence in the longer run. The latter chronically 
produced non-performing loans for the banks, which became a source of recurring 
financial crises, including the crisis in 1997. However, the performance of Korean 
industrial policy has not been as disastrous as in other LDCs. Korean infant industries 
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targeted by industrial policy have matured and grown. As shown in Table 4, the 
growth rate of value added for targeted HCIs is consistently higher than that for 
non-targeted LIs. As a result, their share within the manufacturing sector rose from 
31.2 percent in 1970 to 71.4 percent in 2000. Korea exported mainly garments, textiles, 
veneers, and toys in the 1970s, but came to export mainly automobiles, steel, ships, 
chemical products and electronic goods over the years. The share of targeted HCIs 
in total manufacturing exports was 37.5 percent in 1970, but it rose to 83.1 percent 
in 2000.
How did Korean infant industries mature and grow?
First, Korea’s industrial policy was a part of an export-oriented industrialization 
rather than an import-substituting industrialization. The aim of industrial policy was 
‘creating the next stage export industries’ rather than meeting the demand from the 
‘backward linkage’ effect of existing industries. As a result, industrial policy targeted 
HCIs, but those immediately targeted in the 1970s were composed of smokestack 
industries or lower-end activities of higher technology industries. They were 
technologically easier to absorb, and caused less bottleneck. Their contents changed 
subsequently, but this happened side by side with another effort to develop the next 
stage export industries (or products) and the efforts to enhance technological capability 
(explained below).
Second, the government imposed ‘effective contest’ on firms. In Korea, contrary 
to most developing countries, subsidies and protection were not handed out for free 
without some performance standard attached. Increasing exports, or achieving 
international competitiveness in international markets, was the ultimate criterion of 
performance for the contest (World Bank 1993: Chapter 6; Wade 1995). 
Third, export subsidy and price discrimination of large firms made ‘infant industry 
exports’ possible, which entailed intensive learning (Westphal 1982). 
Fourth, effective competition emerged over time in the protected domestic market 
where firms, notwithstanding the industry or aggregate level concentration, began to 
compete actively on quality, new products, advertising, if not on price (Amsden and 
Singh 1994).  
However, the key  reason  that the HCIs targeted as infant industries matured was 
the move towards liberalization starting in 1979. Korea “abandoned” industrial policy 
in 1979 and switched to  liberalization in the 1980s (Krugman and Obsefld 2006: 
255). It was only with this liberalization process that Korean infant industries began 
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to mature. 
<Table 4> Growth Rate of Value Added and Output
unit: percent
Value added Composition
of ExportsGrowth rate Composition
HCIs LIs HCIs LIs HCIs LIs
1970 20.7 19.3 31.2 68.8 37.5 62.5 
1971 17.5 14.1 32.0 68.0 　 　
1972 18.3 10.8 28.0 72.0 　 　
1973 45.5 21.2 32.9 67.1 　 　
1974 30.2 9.5 42.1 57.9 　 　
1975 13.6 10.5 40.5 59.5 38.8 61.2 
1976 32.8 21.5 43.0 57.0 　 　
1977 21.8 9.2 44.8 55.2 　 　
1978 31.1 16.4 47.7 52.3 　 　
1979 14.7 6.5 49.5 50.5 　 　
1980 1.5 -1.8 48.5 51.5 52.0 48.0
1981 16.4 4.3 50.2 49.8 　 　
1982 9.2 5.8 51.5 48.5 　 　
1983 22.9 10.5 52.8 47.2 　 　
1984 17.9 12.0 53.3 46.7 　 　
1985 7.6 6.8 53.8 46.2 61.2 38.8 
1986 22.5 18.3 55.1 44.9 　 　
1987 23.8 16.0 55.2 44.8 　 　
1988 18.4 8.0 58.8 41.2 　 　
1989 8.1 1.0 59.3 40.7 　 　
1990 15.2 3.1 60.3 39.7 61.2 38.8 
1991 11.9 6.6 60.6 39.4 　 　
1992 8.5 2.4 60.5 39.5 　 　
1993 9.8 -0.6 62.6 37.4 　 　
1994 12.5 6.6 64.0 36.0 　 　
1995 14.5 4.6 67.7 32.3 76.4 23.6 
1996 9.7 0.6 67.8 32.2 　 　
1997 8.2 0.6 69.2 30.8 　 　
1998 -7.4 -9.4 70.1 29.9 　 　
1999 24.0 14.0 69.2 30.8 　 　
2000 19.1 7.4 70.4 29.6 83.1 16.9 
2001 2.6 1.6 69.8 30.2 　 　
2002 10.0 7.7 70.1 29.9 　 　
2003 6.9 -1.7 71.9 28.1 　 　
2004 11.2 1.4 75.1 24.9 　 　
2005 9.5 3.2 75.6 24.4 　 　
2006 8.8 4.1 76.3 23.7 　 　
2007 9.6 4.4 77.5 22.5 　 　
2008 4.3 -1.7 78.9 21.1 　 　
Notes: 1) At constant prices with 1975, 1985, 1995 and 2005 as base years for 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
and 2000s, respectivley.
Data: Calculated from the data provided by the Bank of Korea.
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5. Liberalization and Enhancement of Technological Capability
Korea’s move towards liberalization began out of the reflections on the excesses 
of the heavy and chemical industry drive in the 1970s. It was supported by the 
emergence of new leadership from another military dictator, President Jun Doowhan, 
with a new economic, if not political, orientation in 1980. The move was reinforced 
by the demand from the US and other developed countries for liberalization from 
the mid-1980s. The ‘hard state’ nature of the military government not captured by 
vested interests may have contributed to the implementation of liberalization, as such 
a nature of the developmental state contributed to the implementation of industrial 
policy earlier. The pressure from the US had some salubrious effect when cleverly 
used by the government to contain the powers of vested interests.
Protection was reduced by cutting tariffs and lifting quantitative restrictions. Fiscal 
incentives for HCIs were withdrawn. Banks were privatized, at least nominally, and 
credit rationing was phased out over time. Various policy loans were also phased out. 
As a result, interest rates moved closer to the market-clearing rate. This cutback of 
protection and subsidies is shown in Table 3. The gap in the ERP between the 
targeted and non-targeted industries, after peaking in 1978, narrowed from 1980. It 
continued to fall subsequently, though with some fluctuations. The difference in 
effective corporate tax rate was as large as 30 percentage points in 1981, but fell 
abruptly to less than 2 percentage points in 1982 and 1983. The difference in the 
average cost of borrowing peaked in 1978 and then fell subsequently, though more 
gradually than the difference in effective corporate tax rate.
Entry barriers were lifted, though the de facto situation was often different from 
the official position of the government. Instead of blindly fostering chaebol, the 
government began to regulate their behavior through the Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act. 
Even before the Asian financial crisis broke out in 1997, liberalization had 
proceeded quite significantly. Korea was not the developmental state that it had been 
in the 1960s and 1970s. Korea went on with liberalization while maintaining a high 
growth rate, not only for the whole economy but also for HCIs. Table 4 shows that 
HCIs grew faster than LI even as protection and subsidies were being cut back. In 
addition, the structure of exports changed in favor of HCIs in spite of the cutback 
of subsidies. Rising export share of HCIs accompanied by the reduction of subsidies 
meant their rising international competitiveness. Thus, the rising subsidies, rather than 
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improved international competitiveness, may have been responsible for the rising 
export share of HCIs in the 1970s, but rising international competitiveness rather than 
rising subsidies should be responsible for their rising share from the 1980s. 
The corollary of the maturation and growth of HCIs as infant industries is the 
emergence of quite a few large Korean (mostly chaebol) firms as ‘global players’ within 
a short period of time, with their own brand names and technological capability in 
mid-to-high-technology industries like automobile, iron and steel, ship building, 
semi-conductors and petro-chemicals.  
How did Korea achieve this? 
First of all, liberalization strengthened market discipline. The firms that had entered 
HCIs under industrial policy had committed deeply to those industries, and thus were 
not in a position to give up production in HCIs and go back to LIs. Once they 
decided to stay in the HCIs under the environment of liberalization, they had to 
enhance efficiency for survival and when they decided to enhance efficiency, growth 
was the due option. Of course, this was possible because the Korean government 
managed the liberalization process in such a way that growth of targeted HCIs was 
not undermined. “Abandonment” of the industrial policy did not mean the 
abandonment of the targeted HCIs themselves. 
It is not easy to comprehensively elaborate upon that process here. As shown in 
Table 3, fiscal and financial incentives were withdrawn rather drastically in the early 
1980s; however, protection was reduced more gradually, through the “preannoun-
cement system” for reducing quantitative control and tariff rates. What is clear is that 
the liberalization policy did not apply “shock therapy,” which may have undermined 
the growth of targeted HCIs.
Second, liberalization from the 1980s was accompanied by new efforts to enhance 
technological capability, by both the government and firms. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Korea relied largely on the imitative learning of mature technologies through learning 
by doing, by acquiring know-how from buyers of export goods and sellers of import 
goods (notably, turn-key project machines), limited reverse engineering and diffusion 
of imitated technology among domestic firms. When they needed more formal 
technology, they resorted to imports through licensing, often involving not much 
state-of-the-art technology. Firms felt little need to improve formal technological 
capability though their own research and development (henceforth R&D). The 
government played no significant role to encourage R&D efforts of firms.
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However, over time, wages rose and advanced countries became more reluctant to 
transfer technology. Imitation and reverse engineering became more difficult because 
of strengthened intellectual property rights. Firms accordingly recognized the necessity 
of new strategy to enhance technological capability by the early 1980s. At the same 
time, the government, while phasing out protection and subsidies, began to encourage 
the development of indigenous technologies by subsidizing the R&D efforts of firms.
The government provided fiscal (tax deductions and exemptions) and financial 
subsidies (policy loans) to R&D efforts. The government also established government 
research institutes. Although the government had already established general research 
institutes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the real proliferation of government 
research institutes came in the 1980s, with the establishment of the government 
research institutes in specific fields such as electronics and machinery. The government 
built science parks, where government research institutes were located together with 
private research institutes. 
With this support, in the 1980s and 1990s, firms made intensive efforts to reduce 
the cost of existing products or to develop new products with the eventual aim of 
acquiring international competitiveness. As industrial policy was lifted, firms took over 
the job of targeting infant industries further, or, more often, targeting higher 
technology products within the industries they had entered. All firms, large or small, 
could do the job, but  large chaebol firms fit the bill, given their dominant position 
in the economy. With external capital (and labor) markets still regrettably incomplete, 
the internal capital (and labor) market of chaebol was a strong advantage. Chaebol firms 
also had a strong advantage in the ability to internalize externality, owing to their 
size and diversified structure. Chaebol could also use their global contacts to recruit 
qualified personnel from overseas, by such methods as inviting scientists and engineers 
from collapsing Russia or financially stressed firms in the US. Chaebol could purchase 
financially stressed high technology firms in developed countries, and make strategic 
alliances with multinational corporations from developed countries.
Chaebol and other large firms established their in-house R&D institutes, which often 
collaborated with government research institutes for “technology targeting.” This was 
more frequent in infant industries than in mature industries, which was natural because 
infant industries were more technology intensive. 
As a result, Korean R&D activity rose drastically. R&D expenditure was 0.38 
percent of GDP in 1970 and 0.77 percent in 1980, but it rose to 1.95 percent in 
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1990 and 2.40 percent in 2000. Throughout this process, most Korean students who 
went abroad for higher education began to return en masse in the early 1980s (see 
Kim and Seong 1997). Korea thus managed to reverse the trend of “brain drain” 
on a massive scale, probably for the first time among developing countries in the 
postwar period.
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